We study a negative externality of the stock market on families. We find a significant negative relationship between the local stock market return at the state level during the week and the incidence of domestic violence during the weekend. This relationship is robust to controlling for local economic conditions at the state-month level and only exists for the concurrent week stock returns. These findings suggest that wealth shocks caused by the stock market can affect stress levels within families, escalate arguments, and trigger violent behavior. The effect is attributable to the middle part of the regional income distribution, where both the stock market participation of households and the prevalence of domestic violence are likely to be adequately high to generate substantial aggregate effects. Finally, the effect exists only during periods of low investor sentiment, when economic stress levels are likely to be higher, and disappears in times of high sentiment.
Introduction
Domestic violence is one of the most common types of crime, as well as a very substantial public health problem. Nearly a third of women and more than a quarter of men in the U.S. experience physical violence by an intimate partner in their lifetime, while the estimated annual cost of domestic violence against women alone is more than $5.8 billion (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003, 2011) . Economic models of household bargaining that incorporate domestic violence typically suggest that violence may arise because it provides positive utility to the perpetrator, while the victims' outside options determine their willingness to suffer domestic violence.
1 Card and Dahl (2011) develop a loss-of-control model to analyse how domestic violence can be triggered unintentionally when an argument escalates out of control. Their model provides similar predictions to a household bargaining one in which preferences are affected by emotional cues from a gain-loss function. They also find compelling evidence of domestic violence being triggered by emotional shocks related to losses in football when the home team was predicted to win.
Our paper studies a negative externality of the stock market affecting the incidence of domestic violence. Money is one of the most common sources of stress generally and in intimate relationships in particular.
2 There is also empirical evidence suggesting a link between economic stress and domestic violence.
3 Stock price movements represent shocks to wealth and may either exacerbate or relieve economic stress levels. Engelberg and Parsons (2016) find evidence of stock market having a meaningful impact on the stress levels of individuals, reflected in a significant negative relationship between local stock market returns and hospital admissions for psychological conditions. Based on these arguments, we hypothesize 1 See, e.g., Tauchen, Witte, and Long (1991) ; Aizer (2010) ; Anderberg, Rainer, Wadsworth, and Wilson (2016) 2 For example, in the latest annual "Stress in America" survey conducted by the American Psychological Association (APA) (2017), 62% of respondents report money as a source of stress. In a survey conducted in the U.S. by Harris Poll on behalf of SunTrust Bank in 2015, respondents reported finances to be the most common cause of stress in their relationship, cited by 35% of respondents, followed by annoying habits (25%). A summary of the survey findings is available online at: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/loveand-money-people-say-they-save-partner-spends-according-to-suntrust-survey-300030921.html.
3 See, e.g., Benson, Fox, DeMaris, and Van Wyk (2003) ; Schwab-Reese, Peek-Asa, and Parker (2016) .
1 that stock returns might have a similar effect on stress levels within families and intimate relationships. The increased stress level could potentially trigger and escalate arguments, resulting in an upsurge of domestic violence.
To test our hypothesis, we construct a large sample of incidents of domestic violence in the U.S., using data from the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS), which includes all reports of crime by city/county for the participating police agencies. The agencies included in our data cover a population of 11 million in 1996, the first year included in our sample. The coverage grows to nearly 81 million in 2015, as more agencies gradually join the system. We calculate daily and weekly incident rates, defined as number of reported incidents per 100,000 capita, at the level of individual police agencies. In our analysis, we define domestic violence as reported incidents of assault, aggravated assault, or intimidation by a spouse, partner, or boyfriend/girlfriend.
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We then construct a local stock market index for each U.S. state, calculated as the market-cap-weighted average return of all stocks headquartered in the state. Like Engelberg and Parsons (2016), our methodology utilizes the well-documented tendency of investors to overweight local stocks in their portfolios. Hence, our state-level stock index is likely to be a good proxy for the returns to investors in the same state. 5 This setup allows us to exploit the cross-sectional variation between states for each time period, in addition to variation across time within the state, which increases the robustness of our analysis. While not all families participate in the stock market, more than 20% of U.S. households do have direct investments in stocks, and approximately 50% have direct or indirect stock investments (Bricker, Dettling, Henriques, Hsu, Moore, John Sabelhaus, and Windle, 2014; Bricker and Li, 2017) . This ratio clearly indicates that a sufficient amount of population are exposed to 4 When discussing the existing literature, we use the term domestic violence interchangeably with the terms intimate partner violence and family violence to refer to various types of violence perpetrated within the family, without specifying the exact definition in each case. We generally focus on violence against intimate partners, although the term domestic violence could in other contexts include other forms of violence as well, e.g., parent-to-child violence or sibling violence.
5 French and Poterba (1991) document this "home bias" phenomenon in the international context, while Coval and Moskowitz (1999) show it also applies in domestic investments. Seasholes and Zhu (2010) provide evidence of local bias by individual investors. stock market movements, which could have a potential impact on aggregate rates of domestic violence.
We then perform our main analysis at the weekly level. In order to study the relationship between weekly stock market returns and levels of domestic violence, for each week, we only include the incidents taking place on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, while the weekly stock returns are calculated from Monday to Friday. We choose the weekly frequency because weekly stock market returns represent larger and more meaningful wealth shocks from market movements than daily returns, while still allowing us to capture the relatively instantaneous effect of return shocks for a causal interpretation. Moreover, as discussed in the Internet Appendix Section A.3, the rates of domestic violence are significantly higher during the weekend, when stock markets are closed, than during weekdays. Based on our hypothesis, we anticipate that negative stock market returns should increase stress levels within families, trigger and escalate arguments, and result in higher levels of domestic violence.
Our results provide strong support for the hypothesis. We find a significant negative relationship between state-level stock market returns and rates of domestic violence. This relationship is robust to controlling for police agency fixed effects, holiday fixed effects, statemonth joint fixed effects, and week-of-the-year fixed effects capturing any seasonality within the year. Furthermore, the significant negative relationship between local stock returns and levels of domestic violence only holds for the concurrent week, while lagged (or forward) stock returns have no significant predictive power over domestic violence. This last finding supports a causal interpretation of the negative correlation. We also find that exceptionally negative weekly returns are associated with significantly higher levels of domestic violence.
For example, the effect of a 13% drop in weekly return on domestic violence is nearly three times as big as that of a 7% drop in weekly return. Lastly, the result also holds when including week fixed effects (990 weeks), capturing the cross-sectional differences between states for each week. We also find that the relationship between stock returns and domestic violence is symmetric for both positive and negative stock returns.
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A causal interpretation of the relationship between stock returns and domestic violence requires that an adequate number of households are exposed to the stock market. The existing studies show that the rate of stock market participation increases with income level, while the prevalence of domestic violence does the opposite.
6 This means that at the low end of the income distribution, stock returns are unlikely to be a significant determinant of domestic violence, while at the top end of the distribution, the rates of domestic violence may be too low to generate a substantial effect on the aggregate levels of domestic violence.
These observations suggest that the link between stock returns and domestic violence is likely to be strongest in the middle part of the income distribution. Our empirical results support this prediction. The estimated effect of stock returns on domestic violence is significant in the three middle quintiles based on regional personal income per capita, while neither the top nor the bottom income quintile exhibit a significant relationship.
Furthermore, the negative relationship between stock returns and domestic violence appears to exist only in times of low investor sentiment when economic stress within households is likely to be higher. 7 During periods of high sentiment, we find no statistically significant relationship between stock returns and domestic violence. We also find that the negative relationship between stock returns and domestic violence exists for violence perpetrated by both men and by women. Finally, we study the role of gender equality and find that the link between stock returns and domestic violence perpetrated by women only exists in the states with relatively low gender inequality. In the states with high gender inequality, no such relationship seems to exist.
Our estimates also suggest that the the economic magnitude is not trivial. Our baseline model suggests that a 15-percentage-point decrease in weekly stock return leads to a 1.6% increase in domestic violence around the average rate. 8 The coefficient we estimate for a dummy indicating a local stock market drop of at least 15% suggests an increase in domestic 6 Chien and Morris (2017) provide a good summary of stock market participation by income level. 7 We use the investor sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) . 8 This estimate is based on model 4 in Table 3 .
4 violence of 7.2% from the average rate. For comparison, Card and Dahl (2011) estimate that upset losses in professional football by the home team lead to a roughly 10% increase in at-home male-on-female intimate partner violence on Sundays during the season. Engelberg and Parsons (2016) report an increase of more than 5% in hospital admissions associated with the Black Monday stock market fall of almost 25%.
Our paper is the first to document a link between the stock market and domestic violence.
Domestic violence triggered this way could be viewed as a negative externality of stock market movements that affects household utility beyond the shock to financial wealth, and as such might help explain some of the implied high risk aversion or the limited stock market participation of households. 9 We also add to the literature on the economic causes of domestic violence and provide additional evidence of both the effect of economic stress as well as the effect of emotional cues on the incidence of domestic violence. and Prescott (1985) observed that historical stock returns are much higher than could be rationalized by standard intertemporal economic models, given the realized return volatility. This has been dubbed the "equity premium puzzle" in the literature.
10 It is common in the literature to focus on domestic violence perpetrated by men, although there is obviously also a significant amount of domestic violence perpetrated by women. We adhere to this convention in referring to the perpetrator with masculine and to the victim with feminine pronouns. domestic violence from their parents.
In the empirical literature following this framework, Aizer (2010) shows that decreases in the male-female wage gap reduce violence against women. Anderberg et al. (2016) show that an increase in male unemployment decreases the incidence of domestic violence, while an increase in female unemployment does the opposite. Bloch and Rao (2002) find evidence of men using domestic violence as a bargaining tool to extract transfers from the wife's family in the context of rural India.
The second strand of literature suggests that domestic violence can be triggered unintentionally when an argument escalates out of control. This channel is highlighted by Gelles and Straus (1989) and Kelly and Johnson (2008) , among others. Card and Dahl (2011) develop a more formal loss-of-control model to study the link between family violence and the emotional cues associated with unexpected wins and losses by professional football home teams. In their empirical analysis, they find that upset losses lead to significant increases in at-home violence by men against their wives and girlfriends.
There is also a substantial body of literature linking domestic violence to economic hardship. Conger, Elder, Jr., Lorenz, Conger, Simons, Whitbeck, Huck, and Melby (1990) study the negative impact of economic hardship on marital quality. Gelles and Straus (1989) describe the "typical wife beater" as someone worrying about economic security and dissatisfied with his standard of living. Benson et al. (2003) find evidence of financial strain and employment instability being related to domestic violence.
Another notable strand of literature focuses on the link between domestic violence and substance abuse. de Bruijn and de Graaf (2016) review the literature on the role of substance abuse in domestic violence and conclude that there is robust evidence of alcohol use increasing the likelihood of physical violence. There is also some evidence of cocaine use increasing women's risk of becoming a victim of domestic violence. Luca, Owens, and Sharma (2015) study the impact of alcohol prohibition in India and find evidence that restricting access to alcohol may help reduce domestic violence. There is evidence that treatment for substance 6 abuse can help reduce domestic violence as well (e.g., Murphy and Ting, 2010) .
Finally, Moffitt, Krueger, Caspi, and Fagan (2000) study to what extent perpetrators of domestic violence are the same as or similar to the perpetrators of other crime. They find that domestic violence and general crime represent different constructs that are moderately related; they are not two expressions of the same underlying antisocial propensity. In contrast to our study, Huck (2015) finds a positive relationship between stock returns and general crime rates, arguing that this is consistent with envy models, i.e., individuals see their own position as relatively worse following gains by others. In particular, he argues that low-income individuals who hold less (or no) stocks feel worse off relative to high income individuals on days with high stock returns, resulting in increase of crime rates for low-income individuals.
Domestic violence and stock market returns
We argue that large stock market movements may also have an immediate effect on the stress levels of individuals and hence trigger and escalate arguments, similar to the impact of unexpected football losses documented by Card and Dahl (2011) . This argument is in line with the results of Engelberg and Parsons (2016) , who find a connection between stock market and hospital admissions for psychological conditions. The medical literature provides further indirect support. Chen, Chen, Liu, and Lin (2012) find that daily falls in the stock market index are associated with higher incidence of stroke in Taiwan. Similarly, two studies using data from China find that stock market volatility is associated with higher levels of deaths due to coronary heart disease (Ma, Chen, Jiang, Song, and Kan, 2011) and higher cardiovascular mortality (Lin, Zhang, Xu, Liu, Xiao, Luo, Xu, He, and Ma, 2013) .
A necessary condition for stock returns to have an effect on the level of domestic violence is that a substantial number of people hold stocks. Reassuringly, the literature shows that more than 20% of U.S. households have direct investments in stocks, while approximately 50% have direct or indirect stock investments (Bricker et al., 2014; Bricker and Li, 2017) .
In our domestic violence data, we do not observe what stocks perpetrators are holding.
Hence, we follow Engelberg and Parsons (2016) to exploit the tendency of investors to overwhelmingly hold local stocks (home bias) to identify the relevant stock returns that induce domestic violence.
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Based on these observations, we formulate our main hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis: The incidence of domestic violence is negatively related to local stock market returns.
3 Data and methodology
Domestic violence data
We obtain data on reported incidents of intimate partner violence from the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS), which includes all reports of crime filed by individual police agencies. The number of agencies increases over time, as more agencies join the
NIBRS.
12 The NIBRS data include a large number of small agencies, which have many weekly observations with zero incidents reported. To improve the consistency of the agencies in our sample, and to reduce the noise introduced by large number of zero observations, we only include agencies covering populations of at least 10,000. The NIBRS database is available from 1991 onward, but its coverage in the first few years is very low, which could lead to poor representativeness of the data for these years. Hence, we cut our sample period from 1996 onward. Table 1 shows the number of agencies in our sample in each year. The agencies included cover a population of 80.1 million in 2015, the last year in our data, compared with 11.2 million in 1996, the first year.
11 French and Poterba (1991) document this "home bias" phenomenon in the international context, while Coval and Moskowitz (1999) show it also applies in domestic investments. Seasholes and Zhu (2010) provide evidence of local bias by individual investors.
12 There are also agencies leaving the system, but generally the number of agencies grows every year in our sample period.
8
The incident reports include the date and the time (by the hour) of the incident, as well as a number of other details. It is important to note that the incidents do not necesarily result in arrests, so the coverage of the data is broader than arrested or prosecuted cases.
Similar to Card and Dahl (2011) , we define domestic violence as a reported incident of assault, aggravated assault, or intimidation by a spouse, partner, or boyfriend/girlfriend.
For calculating incident rates, we include all incidents satisfying these criteria, which means that our definition is less restrictive than that adopted by Card and Dahl (2011) , who focus on male-on-female domestic violence occurring at home only.
We construct domestic violence rates, defined as number of reported incidents per 100,000 capita, at the level of individual police agencies. Our main analysis is performed on the basis of weekly observations. In order to establish a relationship between weekly stock market returns and levels of domestic violence, for each week, we only include the incidents taking place on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, while the weekly stock returns are calculated from Monday to Friday. Compared with daily returns, the weekly stock return is more likely to generate a meaningful wealth shock to households, while still allowing us to capture the instantaneous effect of return shocks for a causal interpretation. Moreover, as incidents of domestic violence happen much more often on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday than on other weekdays (shown in our Internet Appendix Section A.3), we focus on the relationship between weekly stock returns and the domestic violence during these three days. In our Internet Appendix, we perform as a robustness check the same analysis excluding incidents taking place on Friday and find similar results to those including Friday, meaning that the analysis is robust to different definitions of domestic violence rates.
Local stock market returns
We obtain stock market data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for all U.S. stocks listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. We combine the stock data with company location data from Compustat. As an additional source of location data, we download all 10-K reports available in electronic format in the EDGAR database and add locations missing in Compustat based on these reports. This yields approximately 90% of the stock-day observations in CRSP during our sample period of 1996-2015.
We then construct weekly state-level stock market index returns as market-cap-weighted average returns of all listed companies headquartered in each state. We use these state-level indices as a proxy for local stock returns for our analysis. Table 2 shows summary statistics for the observations in our sample. The unit of observation is individual police agency on a weekly basis. The average domestic violence rate (DV rate) is 3.1 incidents per 100,000 capita, of which 2.6 perpetrated by men and 0.6 by women.
Results

Description of the data
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The average weekly stock return at the state-level is 0.2%, with 55.5% of weekly observations involving positive and 44.5% negative returns. 4.0% of weekly observations involve negative returns of 5% or more, while 0.6% involve losses of at least 10% and 0.2% losses of at least 15%.
The average agency in our data covers a population of 41,000. We only include agencies covering at least 10,000 people, which thus represents the minimum, while the largest agency in our data covers a population of 1.1 million. The wealth level of agency locations, as measured by county-level personal income (PI) per capita, varies substantially from $12,000 to more than $128,000.
Stock market returns and incidence of domestic violence
Our hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between stock returns and domestic violence.
To test this, we use OLS regressions of the following form: 14 In all regressions, we cluster standard errors by agency.
The results, shown in Table 3 , are consistent with our hypothesis. In all model specifications, the incidence of domestic violence during weekends is significantly negatively related to stock market returns during the same week. As shown by Model 5, the result is robust to including state-month joint fixed effects that capture state-level economic factors at monthly frequency. This mitigates the potential concern that our results are driven by other economic factors that are correlated with stock returns. For example, during economic downturns, stock returns are likely to be lower, while the economic hardship could plausibly cause increased levels of domestic violence, independent of stock returns.
To further mitigate this concern, in Table 4 , we perform the same regressions including lagged and forward returns. We see that only concurrent week returns are statistically significantly related to levels of domestic violence, while the coefficients estimated for neither lagged nor forward returns are statistically significant. This result gives strong support for a causal interpretation of the same-week effect, as it is unlikely that the relevant economic factors that might be correlated with stock returns would change rapidly enough to not be reflected in the surrounding weeks' stock returns.
To investigate the relationship between exceptionally low stock returns and domestic violence, we include an analysis with dummies for weeks where the state-level stock market exhibits negative returns of at least a given magnitude. For example, the variable Drop 7%
takes the value one if the weekly stock market return is negative 7% or lower. We include several different magnitudes of negative returns. The results are shown in Table 5 . The estimated coefficients for the drop dummies increase in an almost monotone fashion with the magnitude of loss. This means that the larger the loss, the larger an increase in domestic violence it is associated with. For instance, the effect of a 13% drop in weekly return on domestic violence is nearly three times as big as that of a 7% drop in weekly return. Table 6 shows that the negative relationship between stock returns and domestic violence is also robust to including week fixed effects, effectively capturing cross-sectional differences across states for each week. With this specification as well, the lagged and forward returns have no statistically significant relationship with domestic violence.
To better understand the nature of the relationship between stock returns and domestic violence, we perform an analysis with returns separated into positive and negative ones. The results, shown in Table 7 , indicate that the effect of stock returns is roughly symmetric for both positive and negative stock returns; positive returns are associated with reduced levels of domestic violence, while negative returns are associated with increased domestic violence.
Stock returns and regional wealth level
As we discuss in Section 2.2, a causal interpretation of the relationship between stock returns and domestic violence is only plausible if an adequate number of households are exposed to the stock market. The rate of stock market participation is positively correlated with income level, as shown by, e.g., Chien and Morris (2017). Conversely, domestic violence is more prevalent among households at lower income levels, as discussed by, e.g., Benson et al. (2003) . Our data confirm the latter observation, as shown in Figure 1 , which plots the average rate of domestic violence against the average Personal Income level.
Given these opposite correlations of domestic violence and stock market participation with income level, it seems logical to ask from which income groups the relationship between stock returns and domestic violence comes from. Intuitively, we expect the strongest relationship in the middle part of the income distribution, where households are likely to have a large enough exposure to the stock market, and where they also represent a high enough proportion of the reported rates of domestic violence. It should also be noted that domestic violence exists even in the highest income categories. Furthermore, even in the lowest income categories, a meaningful proportion of households have some stock investments.
To test for the role of wealth level, we first divide the agencies in our sample into five categories each year, based on the average personal income per capita at the agency location, and then include dummies indicating these wealth categories in our regressions. Table 8 shows the results of these regressions including interactions of stock returns with dummies indicating the wealth level of the agency location. The estimated coefficients are negative for all wealth levels, but only the three middle quintiles exhibit a statistically significant relationship between stock returns and domestic violence. The relationship is not significant in the top and bottom quintiles, and the estimated coefficients are also substantially smaller in magnitude, providing corroborative evidence in support of our hypothesis.
Stock returns and domestic violence vs. investor sentiment
To investigate the relationship between stock returns and domestic violence at different market conditions, we use the Investor Sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) to measure the general market sentiment. This index is a monthly composite measure of a 13 number of proxies for investor sentiment, including the closed-end fund discount, NYSE share turnover, the number and average first-day returns on IPOs, the equity share in new issues, and the dividend premium.
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We categorize the sample period months as High sentiment or Low sentiment, depending on whether the sentiment index is above or below the median during the period. We then include interaction terms between stock returns and dummy variables indicating the level of investor sentiment in our regressions. The results, shown in Table 9 , indicate that the significant negative relationship between stock market returns and domestic violence only exists during periods of low sentiment. The coefficients estimated for the interaction term between stock return and high sentiment are insignificant across all model specifications.
This is intuititive, as we would expect times of low sentiment to be associated with more economic hardship and, hence, more strained relationships within families and intimate relationships. This may lower the required threshold for additional stress caused by negative stock returns to escalate arguments to the level where they result in physical violence.
The role of gender and gender inequality
As Card and Dahl (2011) focus on male-on-female domestic violence occurring on an unexpected football home team loss day, we further explore the role of gender and gender inequality in our context. Table 10 shows a regression analysis with the dependent variable DV rate calculated separately for each gender. Panel A (Panel B) shows the results for domestic violence perpetrated by men (women). We see that the negative relationship between stock market returns and domestic violence holds for both genders, although the statistical significance is weaker for female perpetrators. This may be due to the substantially lower number of incidents of domestic violence perpetrated by women in our data. As shown in Table 2 , less than 20% of the incidents in our data are committed by women.
It seems plausible that the relationship between stock market returns and domestic vi-15 At the time of writing, the investor sentiment data are available online at people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/ olence depends on the cultural context. As discussed in Section 2.1, a number of studies suggest that the incidence of domestic violence is related to the relative economic power between men and women in families. Therefore, in states where gender inequality is higher, we might expect the dynamics of domestic violence to be different as well. We test this prediction using the updated version of the Gender Equality Index provided by Di Noia (2002), based on the methodology originally developed by Sugarman and Straus (1988) . The index is available for each U.S. state. We include a High inequality dummy variable for each state, which takes value one if the state has a below-median index value, zero otherwise. Table 11 shows a regression analysis including interaction terms between stock returns and the High inequality dummy. Panel A shows the overall level of domestic violence depending on stock returns, gender inequality, and their interaction. We find no statistically significant effect of inequality, although high inequality appears to be correlated with higher levels of domestic violence, as suggested by Model 1. However, this specification is very general and does not allow us to make any interpretations of causality.
Panel B shows the same analysis separately for domestic violence perpetrated by men
and women. This analysis shows some interesting differences between genders. From Models 5 and 6, we see that the negative relationship between stock market returns and domestic violence perpetrated women exists only in states with relatively low gender inequality. The relationship is highly statistically significant. In the above-median-inequality states, this relationship appears to completely disappear, as can be seen by comparing the coefficients of the Return variable and its interaction with the High inequality dummy. These coefficients are similar in magnitude and have the opposite signs, effectively offsetting each other for the high-inequality states. For men, no such distinction between high-and low-inequality states seems to exist. The estimated coefficients for the interaction term are negative and not statistically significant.
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We show a significantly negative relation between weekly local stock returns and the incidence of domestic violence from Friday to Sunday in the same week. This effect is immediate and significant only for the concurrent week stock returns, meaning that lagged or forward stock returns have no significant correlation with the level of domestic violence. It is also robust to controlling for local economic conditions at the monthly level. These findings support a causal interpretation of the effect, i.e., stock market movements triggering incidents of domestic violence. This effect is more pronounced in times of low sentiment.
Stock market movements, especially large ones, represent both financial and emotional shocks, which can affect stress levels within families and trigger and escalate arguments.
This represents a very specific but important externality of stock investments. When stock returns also trigger incidents of domestic violence, they also affect household utility beyond the financial shock. This, possibly together with other externalities of stock-market-induced stress, could help explain the seemingly high risk aversion implied by the realized stock market returns and return volatility, often referred to as the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) . If the volatility of the stock market causes variation in utility that is larger than that caused by the purely financial component of utility, then standard economic models measuring utility only by wealth will underestimate the total "risk" of stock investments. The dependent variable is ln(1 + DV rate), where DV rate is calculated as the weekly number of incidents per 100,000 persons for each agency location during Friday, Saturday, and Sunday of each week. We include Agency fixed effects to capture any agency-and locationspecific factors, Holidays fixed effects, including a set of dummies for major holidays in case they take place during the week, State-Quarter or State-Month joint fixed effects, and Week of Year fixed effects (52 weeks). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered by agency.
(1) (2) (3) (4) The dependent variable is ln(1 + DV rate), where DV rate is calculated as the weekly number of incidents per 100,000 persons for each agency location during Friday, Saturday, and Sunday of each week. We include Agency fixed effects to capture any agency-and location-specific factors, Holidays fixed effects, including a set of dummies for major holidays in case they take place during the week, State-Month joint fixed effects, and Week of Year fixed effects (52 weeks). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered by agency.
(1) (2) (3) (4) Significance levels: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01. p-values in parentheses.
Table 6 Domestic violence and weekly stock returns including week fixed effects
The dependent variable is ln(1 + DV rate), where DV rate is calculated as the weekly number of incidents per 100,000 persons for each agency location during Friday, Saturday, and Sunday of each week. We include Agency fixed effects to capture any agency-and location-specific factors and Week fixed effects (990 weeks) to control for timing. Standard errors are clustered by agency.
(1) (2) (3) (4) The dependent variable is ln(1 + DV rate), where DV rate is calculated as the weekly number of incidents per 100,000 persons for each agency location during Friday, Saturday, and Sunday of each week. We include Agency fixed effects to capture any agency-and location-specific factors, Holidays fixed effects, including a set of dummies for major holidays in case they take place during the week, State-Quarter joint fixed effects, and Week of Year fixed effects (52 weeks). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered by agency.
(1) (2) (3) The dependent variable is ln(1 + DV rate), where DV rate is calculated as the weekly number of incidents per 100,000 persons for each agency location during Friday, Saturday, and Sunday of each week. We include Agency fixed effects to capture any agency-and location-specific factors, Holidays fixed effects, including a set of dummies for major holidays in case they take place during the week, State-Quarter joint fixed effects, and Week of Year fixed effects (52 weeks). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered by agency.
(1) (2) The dependent variable is ln(1 + DV rate), where DV rate is calculated as the weekly number of incidents per 100,000 persons for each agency location during Friday, Saturday, and Sunday of each week. We include Agency fixed effects to capture any agency-and location-specific factors, Holidays fixed effects, including a set of dummies for major holidays in case they take place during the week, State-Quarter joint fixed effects, and Week of Year fixed effects (52 weeks). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered by agency.
(1) (2)
High sent. The dependent variable is ln(1 + DV rate), where DV rate is calculated as the weekly number of incidents per 100,000 persons for each agency location during Friday, Saturday, and Sunday of each week. We include Agency fixed effects to capture any agency-and location-specific factors, Holidays fixed effects, including a set of dummies for major holidays in case they take place during the week, State-Quarter or State-Month joint fixed effects, Week of Year fixed effects (52 weeks), and Week fixed effects (990 weeks) to control for timing. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered by agency.
Panel A: Domestic violence perpetrated by men The dependent variable is ln(1 + DV rate), where DV rate is calculated as the weekly number of incidents per 100,000 persons for each agency location during Friday, Saturday, and Sunday of each week. We include Agency fixed effects to capture any agency-and location-specific factors, Holidays fixed effects, including a set of dummies for major holidays in case they take place during the week, State-Quarter joint fixed effects, Week of Year fixed effects (52 weeks), and Week fixed effects (990 weeks) to control for timing. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered by agency.
Panel A: All domestic violence We see that locations with low male unemployment and high female uneployment tend to experience higher levels of domestic violence. This result is consistent with the findings of Anderberg et al. (2016) , who use regional data from the United Kingdom. Controlling for agency fixed effects, higher male unemployment is still associated with lower levels of domestic violence, suggesting that increases in male unemployment tend to decrease domestic violence. Changes in female unemployment do not appear to have a statistically significant effect on domestic violence.
Poorer places, as measured by average personal income per capita at the county level, tend to experience higher levels of domestic violence, consistent with the findings of Benson et al. (2003) . Larger cities, as measured by population, tend to have higher levels of domestic violence. On the other hand, when controlling for agency fixed effects, the estimated coefficient for population becomes negative, suggesting that population growth within a location is actually associated with decreasing levels of domestic violence.
As might be expected by both economic models of household bargaining, as well as general intuition, states with higher gender equality tend to have lower levels of domestic violence. Decreases in the wage gap between genders seem to be associated with decreases in domestic violence, a finding that is consistent with the results of Aizer (2010) . Times of higher investor sentiment appear to be associated with higher levels of domestic violence, a finding that is somewhat counter-intuitive and perhaps worth exploring in future research.
A.2 Return quintiles
As another way of quantifying returns in the regressions, we include an analysis where we divide the weekly returns in each state into quintiles, either by state for the whole period (for the models excluding state-year fixed effects) or by state-year (for the models including state-year fixed effects), and include dummies indicating which return quintile the week belongs to. The results, shown in Table A .4, are consistent with those reported in Table   3 . We exclude the third quintile dummy, so all results are relative to the middle quintile.
In all specifications, levels of domestic violence are the highest in the lowest (first) stock return quintile, and lowest in the highest (fifth) return quintile. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients decrease in a monotonic fashion with return quintile number in all models.
A.3 Daily patterns of domestic violence
Figure A.1 shows the average daily rates of domestic violence per 100,000 persons for our sample. It is clear that the levels of domestic violence are substantially higher during the weekend than during weekdays, and that the levels on Friday are higher than on other weekdays. This observation is confirmed more formally in Table A .2, which shows the results of a regression analysis of daily DV rate with dummies for each weekday as explaining variables. We exclude the dummy for Monday, so the estimated coefficients are relative to Monday. Daily incidents per 100,000
Monday Tuesday WednesdayThursday Friday Saturday Sunday The dependent variable is ln(1 + DV rate), where DV rate is calculated as the weekly number of incidents per 100,000 persons for each agency location during Friday, Saturday, and Sunday of each week. We include Agency fixed effects to capture any agency-and location-specific factors, Holidays fixed effects, including a set of dummies for major holidays in case they take place during the week, State-Year joint fixed effects, and Week of Year fixed effects (52 weeks). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered by agency.
Quintiles by state
Quintiles by state-year 
